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COMES NOW, the Appellant, above-named, by and through his counsel 
of record, Dee W. Smith, and responds to the State's Appellate Brief as 
follows: 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The State has argued in Point I of its brief that since it was the Defendant 
who introduced his prior bad acts on direct examination he cannot challenge 
their admission on appeal. The State relies on the United States Supreme Court 
decision found in Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753 (2000). The Appellant 
recognizes that Ohler and the case at bar are very similar. However, the 
majority's reasoning in Ohler was neither logical nor cogent. For this reason, 
this Court should not rely on the Supreme Court's opinion in Ohler as it 
decides this case. 
This Court does not have to follow the United States Supreme Court 
when it interprets the Utah Rules of Evidence. In State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638 
(Utah 1996), this Court transferred the case to the Utah Supreme Court to 
determine whether Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 
579 (1993) stated a different standard for admitting evidence pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 than the standard under Utah Rule of Evidence 
702 as was articulated in State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989). 
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The Utah Supreme Court noted that Rimmasch was decided four years 
prior to Daubert and had proven to be effective in guiding trial courts in 
determining the admissibility of scientific evidence. State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 
at 642. The Utah Supreme Court also recognized that its interpretation of Utah 
Rule of Evidence 702 in Rimmasch was based, in part, on Utah case law which 
superimposed a more restrictive test when scientific evidence is at issue. Id. 
The Court held "that Rimmasch sets forth the proper standard for admitting 
scientific evidence under Utah Rule of Evidence 702." Id. 
In the case of State v. Fedorowicz, 52 P.3d 1194 (Utah 2002), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated in a footnote that "[although the Federal Rules of 
Evidence are a separate body of law from the Utah Rules of Evidence, if the 
reasoning of a federal case interpreting or applying a federal evidentiary rule is 
cogent and logical, we may freely look to that case, absent a Utah case directly 
on point, when we interpret or apply an analogous Utah evidentiary rule." Id. 
atfn. 1. 
Although the federal rule is identical to Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, the federal rules are a separate body of law from the Utah rules. This 
Court can apply the reasoning from a federal case interpreting a rule of 
evidence if that reasoning is cogent and logical. The reasoning in Ohler is 
neither cogent nor logical and should not be used as a guide in this case. 
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As the dissent in Ohler noted "[t]he holding is without support in 
precedent, the rules of evidence, or the reasonable objectives of trial . . ." 
Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. at 760(dissenting opinion). 
In the case at bar, the trial court allowed the State to introduce evidence 
of Defendant's prior convictions as part of its case in chief. Although it elected 
not to do that, the Defendant was subject to cross-examination on his prior 
convictions if he testified. The Defendant did testify and, as the State has 
acknowledged, he testified that he had been to prison for distributing 
marijuana. (R. 495/162). On cross-examination the State pointed out that there 
were four convictions altogether. (R. 495/167). Then during the State's closing 
argument the prosecutor mentioned the convictions again. (R. 496/49). 
The holding in Ohler forces a defendant to choose whether he will 
exercise his right to testify on his own behalf, thus increasing his chances of an 
acquittal or to not testify and maintain his appeal rights. Such a policy is 
contrary to common sense and efficient judicial administration. 
The dissent in Ohler was cognitive of this fact when it stated; 
It is true that when convictions are revealed only on cross-
examination, the revelation also warns the factfinder, but the 
timing of their disclosure may do more. The jury may feel that in 
testifying without saying anything about the convictions the 
defendant has meant to conceal them. The jury's assessment of 
the defendant's testimony may be affected not only by knowing 
that she has committed crimes in the past, buy by blaming her for 
not being forthcoming when she seemingly could have been. 
Creating such an impression of current deceit by concealment is 
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very much at odds with any purpose behind rule 609, being 
obviously antithetical to dispassionate factfinding in support of a 
sound conclusion. The chance to create that impression is a 
tactical advantage for the Government, but only in the majority's 
dismissive sense of the term; it may affect the outcome of the 
trial, but only if it disserves the search for truth. Ohler v. United 
States, 529 U.S. at 764(dissenting opinion). 
The Supreme Court's holding in Ohler is also contrary to the scholarship 
on the subject. See, e.g., 1 J. Wigmore, Evidence § J_8, p. 836 (Tillers rev. 
1983) ("[A] party who has made an unsuccessful motion in limine to exclude 
evidence that he expects the proponent to offer may be able to first offer that 
same evidence without waiving his claim of error"); M. Graham, Handbook of 
Federal Evidence § 103.4, p. 17 (1981)("However, the party may . . . himself 
bring out evidence ruled admissible over his objection to minimize its effect 
without it constituting a waiver of his objection"; 1 McCormick, supra, § 55 at 
246 ("[W]hen [a party's] objection is made and overruled, he is entitled to treat 
this ruling as 4the law of the trial' and to explain or rebut, if he can, the 
evidence admitted over his protest."); D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal 
Evidence § 11, p. 65 (1977)("Having done his best by objecting, the adversary 
would be indeed ill treated if then he was held to have thrown it all away by 
doing his best to protect his position by offering evidence of his own"). 
The dissent in Ohler correctly pointed out that "[t]he general thrust of 
the law of evidence, then, not only fails to support the majority's approach, but 
points rather clearly in the other direction." Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. at 
4 
763 (dissenting opinion). A criminal defendant should not have to choose 
between trying to win the trial or winning an appeal. "Allowing the defendant 
to introduce the convictions on direct examination thus tends to promote 
fairness of trial without depriving the Government of anything to which it is 
entitled. There is no reason to discourage the defendant from introducing the 
conviction herself. . ." Id. at 764 (dissenting opinion). 
Since the majority opinion in Ohler is neither logical nor cogent and is 
contrary to common sense, the scholarship on the subject, and efficient judicial 
administration this Court should reject the Supreme Court's holding in Ohler 
and find that a defendant does not waive his right to appeal from an adverse in 
limine ruling if he introduces the evidence himself. 
POINT II 
The State has argued in its reply brief that under the first prong of the 
Franks/Nielsen test articulated in State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), 
that the Defendant has failed to show that Officer Machielson made a "false 
statement intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth . . ." 
See, Appelle's Br. P34-35. The evidence is clear that Officer Machielson 
included misleading information in an attempt to strengthen the affidavit. 
He called a report from an anonymous, refused complainant an 
"intelligence report, making no mention of the fact this report was an 
uncorroborated anonymous report." What is even more troubling about this 
5 
part of the affidavit is that it was clear that Officer Machielson had been 
involved with the Riverdale case, had made an arrest on that case and didn't 
believe that the Defendant was a suspect in the case. Officer Machielson 
admitted that someone had been prosecuted and convicted in that case and that 
as far as he knew, the Defendant was not a suspect. (R. 494/248-49). This is 
clearly a showing that there was a false statement in the affidavit that at the 
very least was made with a reckless disregard for the truth. 
The trial court found that even without the "intelligence reporf there 
was probable cause. The trial court indicated that what was most significant 
was "the fact that the police are able to have a confidential informant go in, 
make three different purchases from the defendant.. ." (R. 490/31-32). 
The problem with this conclusion is that the confidential informant was 
not reliable and the information in the affidavit concerning this informant was 
inaccurate and misleading. The affidavit specifically stated that the informant 
had worked for several different agents of the Strike Force for several years and 
had provided information that had led to several arrests and convictions. This 
information was false. The informant testified at trial that he became involved 
with the Strike Force because the Defendant was causing problems for a 
neighbor and that Agent Machielson was the first agent he was introduced to. 
(R. 493/164-65). The affidavit also failed to mention that the informant was 
being paid for the work he was doing for the Strike Force. 
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The State has argued in footnote four of its reply brief that these issues 
are procedurally barred since they were raised for the first time on appeal. See, 
Appelle's Brief, P.35, fn. 4. While the State is correct that unpreserved issues 
cannot be raised on appeal absence a plain error or ineffective assistance claim, 
the issue of the adequacy of the search warrant affidavit was properly raised in 
the trial court. In State v. Kitchen, 808 P.2d 1127 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), the 
State made the same argument that an issue surrounding a suppression motion 
had not been adequately briefed in the trial court. This Court disagreed and 
stated that "the constitutionality of the roadblock in question was precisely the 
ground raised below, and although defendant's argument emphasized a 
statutory argument, the constitutionality of this roadblock was also adequately 
briefed and presented. Moreover, the constitutionality question was the precise 
basis of the trial court's ruling." Id. at 1129. 
Likewise, the sufficiency of the search warrant affidavit was the precise 
issue that Defendant raised in the trial court. He briefed and argued that the 
misleading statements caused it to be defective and that the evidence should 
therefore be suppressed. Since the issue was adequately preserved this Court 
should find that the affidavit was deficient and the trial court's denial of the 
motion should be reversed. 
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POINT III 
The Defendant did not waive his right to appeal the trial court's denial 
of cross-examination of Russ Hartley concerning specific instances of conduct. 
Defendant's trial attorney made the argument under Rule 608 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence that he should be allowed to cross examine Mr. Hartley concerning 
specific instances of conduct. The trial court clearly denied the Defendant's 
request to cross-examine Mr. Hartley on these matters. See, R. 493/282. The 
trial judge did state, "I guess if you want to find a case for me that's right on 
point that says firing somebody for embezzlement constitutes untruthfulness, 
I'll certainly take a look at it and reconsider in the morning." (R. 493/282). 
The fact that the Defendant did not find a case "right on point" does not 
preclude him from raising the issue on appeal. It is unreasonable to expect a 
defendant to be able to spend hours researching case law in the middle of a trial 
for a case "right on point." There are numerous issues that arise during a trial 
where there is no case law "right on point." In fact, a computer search of Utah 
case law brings up zero cases with the words Rule 608 and embezzlement in 
the same sentence. 
Here, the trial court incorrectly applied Rule 609 requirements, did not 
consider the facts concerning Mr. Hartley's conduct and whether they 
constituted a specific instance of untruthfulness and also failed to do a Rule 403 
analysis. Just because Defendant did not find a specific case on point after the 
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judge ruled the evidence was inadmissible does not preclude him from 
challenging that denial on appeal. The plain language of Rule 608 is very clear. 
The trial court simply abused its discretion by not allowing cross-examination 
of Mr. Hartley^ past conduct that was probative of his character for 
untruthfulness. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant's constitutional rights were repeatedly violated both 
before and during his trial. For these reasons, he respectfully requests this 
Court to reverse his convictions. 
DATED this V day of May, 2004 
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